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INTRODUCTION
A growing number of developing countries have recently initiated attempts to extend social health insurance coverage to the vulnerable groups in their populations using tax subsidies. One of the largest of such initiatives is the implementation, since 2003, of a health insurance scheme for the rural population, namely the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) by the Chinese government. As a voluntary and heavily subsidized scheme, it has seen extremely rapid growth of coverage in comparison to most new schemes in developing countries (Hsiao and Shaw, 2007; Yip and Hsiao, 2008) . By the end of 2010, 96% of the rural population (840 million people) had been enrolled in NCMS (Ministry of Health, 2010) . Generally, the NCMS is heavily oriented at inpatient care and, especially in the period before the 2009 Health Care Reform, was characterized by rather high copayments and coinsurance rates. Outpatient care was typically covered through Medical Savings Accounts, which involve no risk pooling. Although the central government has issued broad guidelines for the design of the scheme, the policy details and implementation responsibilities have been decentralized to the county level local governments . As a result, important scheme features, including the benefit package, the reimbursement level and payment methods, display considerable variation across counties and over time, which can be used to identify the impact of the scheme.
Many studies have recently sought to assess the impact of NCMS coverage on health care access and financial protection, mostly using the uneven rollout of NCMS across counties as a way of identifying its effects.
1 Few studies so far have exploited the heterogeneity in scheme features to identify its effect. This study aims to add to the literature on the effects of NCMS, by using recent household data from Ningxia and Shandong province, complemented with administrative data. We limit our analysis to NCMS enrollees and exploit cross-county variation in NCMS characteristics to identify impact. We construct measures of average NCMS generosity using instrumenting methods, and evaluate effects of these on the probability of using care, the choice of provider and the amounts spent. In part, our results confirm earlier findings of NCMS being effective in increasing access to care, but not increasing financial protection. In addition, we find that NCMS enrollees are sensitive to the incentives set in the NCMS design when choosing their provider, but also that providers seem to respond by increasing prices and/or providing more expensive care.
The paper is organized as follows. First, section 2 discusses the literature on the effects of NCMS. Thereafter, as our empirical strategy is quite influenced by the nature of available data, section 3 first introduces a description of the study setting and data, and then, section 4 explains the methodological approach to identify the NCMS impact. Section 5 presents estimation results, followed by a summary of results and discussion.
1 For a review of these studies see e.g. Wagstaff, Yip et al. (2009a) ; ; ; You and Kobayashi (2009) .
LITERATURE REVIEW
Although cross-sectional studies present mixed results regarding the effects of NCMS on health care utilization (Hao et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2010; Zhou et al., 2011; Qian et al., 2009) , those studies that address the problem of endogenous NCMS participation using panel data, generally do find that NCMS increases health care utilization. Wagstaff et al. (2009b) use a differences-in-differences analysis on a panel dataset from the 2003 and 2005 National Health Services Survey (NHSS) and conclude that NCMS has had an appreciable positive impact on the utilization of both outpatient (23%) and inpatient services (27%). Lei and Lin (2009) , using the date of county-level NCMS inception as an instrumental variable for an individual's NCMS status (in data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)), find no effect of NCMS on utilization of formal medical service and a negative effect on the use of traditional Chinese doctors.
To examine the effect of NCMS on provider choice, Babiarz et al (2010) The evidence of NCMS offering financial protection is less compelling. Most studies find little or no impact of NCMS coverage on out-of-pocket expenditures (Lei and Lin, 2009; Wang et al., 2010; Liu and Tszegai, 2011) and some even report the curious finding of out-of-pocket spending to increase as a result of NCMS introduction (Wagstaff et al., 2009b; Zhou et al., 2009) . Effects are also found not to be homogeneous across socioeconomic group. Wagstaff et al (2009b) and Yu et al (2010) find the increase in the use of inpatient care to be larger among rich than poor NCMS participants, and therefore also the increase in out-of-pocket spending to be larger among the richer enrollees. Using (panel) data from the CHNS, Liu and Tszegai (2011) find that NCMS does not reduce outpatient or inpatient expenditure, but increases the incidence of catastrophic expenditures in western regions.
Few studies so far have examined the heterogeneity of the NCMS' effects across scheme design and service packages. Using NCMS "policy bundles" characterized by level of health facility for outpatient services covered, and by outpatient reimbursement type, Babiarz et al. (2010) find that different "policy bundles" are not associated with different probabilities of medical care use and provider choices, but they do find more generous bundles to reduce the out-of-pocket medical spending. Wagstaff et al. (2009b) 
STUDY SETTING & DATA
We use the variation in NCMS design across six counties in two provinces, Ningxia and Shandong, and over two years (2006 and 2008) to estimate the effects of NCMS on access to care and financial protection. The survey and administrative data that we use were collected in three counties in Shandong province (Zhangqiu, Changle, and Dong'e) and Ningxia province (Yongning, Qingtongxia and Zhongning) for a study funded by the European Commission (RHINCAV) (Sun et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2012) .
NCMS design in the six study counties
A detailed questionnaire was administered to NCMS officials to obtain information on the exact NCMS implementation details in each of the counties. Table 1 summarizes some of the relevant NCMS characteristics per county and survey wave. values using province specific Consumer Price Indices.
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Our models also include a vector of individual level covariates on demographics (age and sex, marital status, household size), socioeconomic condition (education, occupation, log income 5 ) and enrolment with other insurance schemes than NCMS.
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To capture variation in need for care across individuals we also include a set of variables related to individuals' health status. In models for outpatient care we include information on sickness in the four weeks preceding the survey, self-perceived severity of illness and rest days due to sickness. Models on the probability of inpatient care include variables related to chronic diseases and disease severity, while models on length of stay and financial protection also have information on diagnosed diseases and whether or not the hospitalization involved 4 Consumer Price Indices are taken from China Statistical Yearbook 2008 Yearbook & 2009 Household income is calculated by summing all market earnings across the household as well as the total value of all other non-market goods and services produced within the household. Totals are deflated to 2006 values using province specific CPI and divided by household size to obtain per capita estimates. 6 We do not have details on this supplemental health insurance cover, but the data suggest this is mostly private, commercial insurance as coverage is concentrated among the rich and higher educated.
Therefore we have excluded individuals with additional coverage from the analysis on financial protection.
surgery. 7 The International Classification of Diseases (ICD 10) (World Health Organization, 2007 ) is used to classify respondents' reported disease symptoms into about 20 main categories, which were further reduced to about 5 categories to ensure sufficient observations in each category. Appendix 1 provides more detail and some descriptive information of all covariates used.
Next to household level data, we also have access to aggregate data from the NCMS claims offices in each of the counties on the total amount of insurance claims and reimbursements made for the entire NCMS population within that county.
METHODS
We aim to identify the impact of NCMS on access to care and financial protection by exploiting the variation in NCMS design across counties. This section first describes the constructed measures of NCMS generosity and the models used to estimate their effect.
Calculation of NCMS coverage degree
The scheme's degree of coverage for a specific service depends on three characteristics: (i) the copayment, (ii) the reimbursement rate, and (iii) the ceiling.
For outpatient care and for counties with SPA, (ii) and (iii) are typically constant 8 and (i) does not apply. For inpatient care, (i) and (ii) vary with the provider chosen, and (ii) also depends on the total costs of the hospitalization (see Figure 1 for an example). 7 The set of ill-health variables is not constant across all models because some survey questions are specific to the section on in-or outpatient care. 8 The reimbursement for outpatient care only varies with providers and services in Zhangqiu County, and only counties in Shandong apply a ceiling for outpatient expenditures (Table 1) .
Given this variation in coverage of inpatient care, and the limited number of county/years observations, we combine all three dimensions of cover into one measure to capture the NCMS coverage degree for inpatient care across counties/years.
Calculating average reimbursement rates (ARR) based on households'
expenditures and NCMS reimbursements as recorded in the household data could be affected by individuals' behavioral responses to differences in NCMS, especially for inpatient care for which the reimbursement rate varies with the total costs of care.
As a result, the coverage rate may be co-determined by the (average) utilization to be explained. Average reimbursement rates calculated from the claims data are less likely to be affected directly by the behavioral response of households in the survey, but to the extent that the sample reflects the behavior of the entire relevant population group the endogeneity problem does remain. To deal with this potential endogeneity problem, we adopt two different approaches. The aim is therefore to obtain a summary measure of the extent to which NCMS insured are covered, which is not (or at least less) dependent on the utilization decisions of the relevant populations.
In a first approach, we use an instrumental variables (IV) method to estimate measures of NCMS coverage per county. We use official reimbursement rates, copayments and ceilings, as shown in Table 1 , as instruments for the average coverage rates calculated from the NCMS claims data. These instruments are exogenous and only affect health care use through their effect on NCMS coverage, thereby satisfying the two necessary conditions for valid instruments (Wooldridge, 2002) . First stage regressions are run separately for all types of health care providers, and weighted averages of predictions from these models are then used as generosity measures (predicted ARR). 9 While this approach should deal with the endogeneity problem, the small number of county-level observations (12) limits the power to identify the contributions of scheme parameters in the first stage regressions.
Therefore, in a second approach we construct a measure of NCMS coverage, independent of the county-specific utilization behavior, using a standardization approach. First we calculate for each individual in the sample, the proportion of hospitalization expenditures that s/he would have been reimbursed under each of the 12 (6 counties times 2 waves) NCMS schedules. For each county and wave, we then average these estimated proportions across all individuals to obtain the average reimbursement rate (standardized ARR). 10 In effect, it indicates what NCMS reimbursement would have been had the entire sample lived in the relevant county and been subjected to the reimbursement rules of the relevant year. Because each county's coverage rate is based on the health care use pattern of the entire sample, variation in this rate only reflects differences in the generosity of the NCMS scheme.
The approach does assume that there is no variation across counties in the type of drugs and services eligible for reimbursement.
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9 Weights are calculated as frequency of visits with the specific health care provider in the county (calculated from claims data). 10 This approach is inspired by Contoyannis et al. (2005) .
11 While each county can define its list of covered drugs and services in accordance with national and provincial guidelines, in practice, the uncovered services are very similar across counties.
For outpatient care, most of the cross-county variation in NCMS designs derives from the type of account (SPA or MSA). Among counties with SPA, the variation in reimbursement rates is rather limited. We therefore only investigate whether the effects of SPA type schemes differ from MSA.
Model estimation
Our strategy for identifying the effect of coverage on health care access, choice and financial protection basically relies on a pooled regression analysis with predicted ARR and standardized ARR as our main variables of interests. The binary outcomes are assumed to be generated as follows:
where . is the indicator function and indicates health care of individual i at time t. The model includes a time effect , which captures the trend in health care use between the two waves that is common across all individuals; a full set of village fixed effects α which absorb time invariant geographic differences; and a vector of time varying county specific variables, , which includes the NCMS coverage rate (predicted ARR or standardized ARR) and county level GDP per capita (see second row in Linear Models (GLM), which are well suited to deal with skewed outcomes and avoid retransformation problems (Mihaylova et al., 2011; Manning and Mullahy, 2001 ). The central structure of a GLM is an exponential conditional mean:
with . representing the link function and . the distributional family. To model total and out of pocket expenditures on health care, we used Box-Cox tests and Modified Park Tests to select, respectively, the link function and the family of GLM models that best suits our data (Manning and Mullahy, 2001 ). The preferred GLM specification was one with log link and gamma family. The proportion of out of pocket spending in total spending is modeled by a GLM with the logit link and the binomial family (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996; Wooldridge, 2001 ).
Despite taking account of additive village effects in all models, we nonetheless adjust standard errors for clustering at the county level (see e.g. Bertrand et al., 2004) . This clustering allows for the possibility of serially correlated county-level shocks (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p.319) , but inflates standard errors. Given the limited number of counties (6), a further consequence of this clustering is that we have limited degrees of freedom. We have therefore checked robustness of results to clustering on the village level, and confirmed that inference presented in this paper is conservative. Table 2 shows summary statistics for all dependent variables, and Appendix 1 for all independent variables. The average probability of NCMS enrollees seeking in-and outpatient care is 5.4% and 9.9%, and the average spending per admission and visit is 4300 and 390 RMB respectively. Table 2 should be inserted here. Table 3 shows selected estimation results for models explaining the probability of using both in-and outpatient care. For parsimony, marginal effects are only shown for a selected set of covariates, but all models include covariates listed in Appendix 1.
RESULTS

Descriptive statistics
Effects of NCMS on utilization of care
The first two columns show marginal effects from a conditional logit model of the probability of a hospitalization in the last year, with a positive and significant coefficient for both measures of NCMS coverage. A one percentage point increase in NCMS coverage raises the probability of using inpatient care by 0.003-0.004, which corresponds to an increase of about 7% compared to the overall sample probability (0.05). An increase of 40 percentage points in NCMS coverage, which is equal to the range in NCMS coverage rate in the sample (both in predicted ARR and standardized ARR), would raise the admission probability by 0.16. The presence of other, mostly private health insurance cover raises the probability of using inpatient care by 0.06, or the equivalent of a 15 percentage points rise in NCMS coverage. Using a sort of placebo test, we found no significant effect of county NCMS coverage on the probability of using inpatient care among non-NCMS members. Table 3 should be inserted here.
The third column of Table 3 shows estimates for selected covariates on the probability of using inpatient care at county hospital or higher level (1), as compared to THCs (0). 12 For this model, we use the ratio of the weighted average reimbursement rates for county and higher level hospitals to the reimbursement rate for THCs and only use the much smaller sample of those hospitalized in the last year (1036 observations). 13 Because of the limited number of users of some facilities, especially at higher level, we can only show results for the predicted ARR, not for the standardized ARR. A one unit increase in the ratio of average reimbursement rates raises the probability of seeking care at a county hospital or higher level by 0.9. The maximum variation in this ratio in the sample is 0.48
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, which corresponds to an increase of 0.43 in the probability of using higher level care, equivalent to a 54% increase compared to the baseline mean (0.79).
The fourth and fifth columns show coefficients from an OLS model for (the log of) 12 For outpatient care, the variation in the type of facilities that qualify for reimbursement varies between provinces. In Ningxia, only outpatient visits at the county hospital or higher can be reimbursed, while in Shandong only visits at the village clinics qualify for NCMS reimbursement. The effects of this difference in NCMS design can therefore not be distinguished from the province effect. length of inpatient stay. The effect of NCMS coverage is positive but not significant for either measure of coverage. A surgical treatment, admission at a higher level facility, and having other types of health insurance cover are all found to lengthen the hospital stay.
The last column of Table 3 displays estimation results for utilization of outpatient care and reveals that a system of risk pooling leads to a significantly higher probability of an outpatient visit (by 6 percentage points) than a system of Medical Saving Accounts, or a combination of both. Interestingly, having other health insurance cover is found to lower the probability of an outpatient visit, which may be an indication that privately insured individuals are more inclined to seek (covered) higher level care.
Effects of NCMS on financial protection
Having established the effects on utilization patterns, we want to verify whether, on balance, a higher degree of NCMS coverage provides covered individuals with greater financial protection. Results for NCMS effects on financial protection for in-and outpatient care are presented in Table 4 and 5 respectively. Note that these models are only based on the sample of individuals that have used the relevant type of care and do not have supplemental insurance. Table 4 and 5 should be inserted here.
Higher NCMS average reimbursement rates for inpatient care do lead to increased total spending for an inpatient visit (first and second column in Table 4 ), while they only weakly affect the out of pocket payments made by individuals (third and fourth column). A one percentage point increase in the standardized ARR (predicted ARR) leads to a 33 RMB (24 RMB) increase in total spending, which is about a 0.8% (0.6%) rise compared to the sample average of 4259 RMB. As expected, hospitalizations in more specialized facilities and involving surgery are found to substantially raise the total cost, as well as the amount of OOP spending. The fifth and sixth columns show effects of covariates on the share of OOP spending in total spending, and illustrate that a one percentage point increase in NCMS coverage leads to a decrease in the OOP share of 0.003 (the average share is 0.84), although the effect is barely significant. An admission to a higher level facility is associated with a higher OOP share, a longer stay with a lower share. The latter finding is probably related to the non-linearity of the reimbursement rate: typically NCMS schemes become more generous at higher levels of spending.
Estimated effects of NCMS coverage on financial protection from expenditures on outpatient care are presented in Table 5 . We do not find significant effects of SPA on total spending per visit or on out-of-pocket spending per visit (first and second column), but we do find SPA to substantially reduce the share of OOP spending per visit (by 0.063) as compared to MSA (the average share is 0.93) (third column).
Finally, Table 6 shows results of NCMS coverage on health care spending at the household level. It suggests that a NCMS scheme with SPA for outpatient care increases a households' budget share spent on outpatient care (by 0.011 -see first column), while a more generous reimbursement scheme for inpatient care has no significant effect on the budget share of inpatient care (second and third column).
These results reflect the combination of more generous NCMS schemes increasing health care use while not lowering the cost per visit, and can be interpreted as NCMS not delivering a high degree of financial protection. Table 6 should be inserted here.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of the NCMS in rural China represents one of the largest, and most impressive, health care reforms in the developing world since the millennium. The literature to date has mainly used the uneven rollout of NCMS across counties as a way of identifying its effects on access to care and financial protection. This study uses a different approach. It exploits the cross-county variation in NCMS generosity in two recent years in two provinces and adopts an instrumenting approach to estimate the access and protection effects of a continuous measure of coverage level.
We find clear evidence that adoption of a more generous scheme raises the probability of using both inpatient and outpatient care. Not surprisingly, the SPA system for outpatient care is more effective in improving access than the system of household MSA. Given the well-documented low access to medical care in rural China (Center for Health Statistics and Information, 2004, 2009) , and the considerable copayments still required under the current NCMS schemes in place (especially for inpatient care), discretionary use of care is likely to be limited and the observed effect on use is therefore likely to mostly reflect better access to needed medical care. We also find evidence of variation in NCMS coverage affecting the choice of provider for inpatient care: enrollees are more likely to choose the provider with the higher reimbursement.
Our results indicate that NCMS also extends financial protection, as NCMS reduces the share of OOP spending for an inpatient and outpatient visit, but these effects are relatively small. More worrisome is that we find higher NCMS cover to raise total spending, per outpatient visit as well as per hospitalization, and to increase the OOP spending per inpatient stay. As this effect is larger for total than for OOP spending (even three times as large for inpatient care), this very much suggests that users are using -or providers are providing -more expensive care. We cannot ascertain whether and to what extent this more expensive use of care is more or less appropriate or of higher or lower quality, but given that providers are typically paid on a fee-for-service basis in these counties, they do have an incentive to respond to greater coverage by providing more expensive -and potentially unnecessary --care (Yip and Hsiao, 2008; Hu et al., 2008; Wang et al., 2011) . This may imply that the increased health spending has greater effect on provider welfare rather than on patient welfare.
In sum, these results do indicate some degree of success for NCMS in providing better access and financial protection for China's rural population, but issues of supply-side moral hazard remain a real threat to the system. This is consistent with recent results from a trend study using the National Health Services Survey, which
shows that hospital admissions in rural areas had increased from 3•4% in 2003 to 6.8% in 2008 but that the proportion of households incurring catastrophic health spending levels also increased from 13.6% in 2003 to 15.1% in 2008 (Meng et al., 2012) .
In drawing these conclusions, there are some limitations to be kept in mind. First, while the data we use are very rich in many respects, our NCMS effects identification relies on information for six counties at two points in time, and hence has limited power to identify effects from variation in NCMS design. This may be the reason why we do not find significant heterogeneity in effects by poverty status. Second, as the data are only a panel at the village level, not at the individual level, we can only control for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity at the village level. Third, the variation in NCMS design and generosity across counties may not be entirely exogenous and may well depend on factors also influencing individuals' health care seeking behavior across counties (e.g. quality of care). However, given that we control for a large set of individual and household level characteristics, village fixed effects and county GDP per capita, the problem of omitted variable bias is unlikely to be large. In spite of these limitations, we feel comfortable to conclude that in the first phase the expanded degree of coverage offered by NCMS in China has contributed to improved access to services to the rural populations in Ningxia and Shandong, but Preliminary evidence suggests that financial protection has increased following these reforms (Yip et al., 2010; Meng et al., 2012) but further rigorous evaluation is warranted to assess whether China is on a sustainable track towards a more accessible system of health care coverage. 
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